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No. 73-5280

Cert to Ct App Oregon
(Schwab, Foley; Fort dissenting)

FULLER
State-criminal

v.
OREGON

.Timely

1. Petr challenges a condition of pr.obation requiring hi.m

to reimburse the county for the cost of his court-appointed
attorney's fees.
2. FACTS, Petr entered a guilty plea to an information
charging him with third degree .sodomy. Petr had no prior
convictions, except for a misdemeanor trespass. The judge
suspended imposition of sentence and placed petr on a term of

-2five years' probation with the following conditions,

C

(1) That defendant be confined to Multnomah
County ~orrectional Institution for a period
of one year, said confinement to allow defendant
to continue school; and,

'1

(2) That defendant pay the cost of his attorney's
~ees a~d $375 for the cost of the defense attorney's
1nvest1gator.

~

Petr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon. The~rt
ruled that the Oregon statute;1authorizing the imposition of such
costs did not violate petr's Sixth Amendment· right to counsel

-----

and did not deny him Equal Protection of the law.
The court reasoned that the assessment of costs under the
statute, to include attorney's fees, did not deprive a defendant
of Sixth Amendment rights because the statute is not mandatory
and because discretion always resides in the court to determine
'

C

.

ability to pay, The court was impressed that the statutes required
a showing that a defendant "is or will be able to pay costs" and
that, in assessing costs, a court must consider "the nature of
the burden that payment of costs will impose~' including "manifest
hardship on the defendant or his immediate family."
The court distinguished this Court's recent decision in
James

Y..!.,

Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), in which a Kansas recoup-

ment statute was invalidated on Equal Protection grounds because
it denied exemptions from execution afforded to other judgment

.,,.,_ I

debto'rs. No such distinct ions are drawn in the Oregon statute.
The court also held that the possibility of parole revocation
for nonpayment of costs did not unduly discriminate against
defendants because such revocation can occur only in sharply
~/ The statutes are attached to this memo.
''::_./ The Court reserved the question in this case. "Whether the
statutory obljr:;ations for rep:iymcnt irnpermissi.li]y deter the exercise
of rthc ri~ht to counsel] is a question we need not rcAch, for we
fincJ the st:a1-ute lJeforn 11s constitutionally infirm on other r,rounds."

-3-

0

limited circumstances.
Judge Fort dissented. He adopted the view taken by
the California Supreme Court that recoupment "constitutes
an impediment to the free exercise of a right guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment." In £!2. Allen, 71 Cal,2d 388, 78 Cal. Rptr

207, 455 P.2d 143, cert denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969). Judge
Fort noted that this recoupment statute, unlike the Kansas
statute in James, is a part of the criminal process. As such,
it could well inhibit a defendant, particularly in matters

carrying a lesser penalty, fran exercising to the full the
rights guaranteed to him not only under the Sixth Amendment
but also under concepts of funda~ental fairness enshrined in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. "In my view it constitutes

()

an invidious discrimination between the indieent defendant and
the well-to-do defendant." Judge Fort also would hold the
statute unconstitutional under James because "nothing in the
challenged statute here affords the defendant in a revocation
pro~eeding to the exemptions provided debtors generally under
Oregon law,"
Petr qppealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon which denied
his petition for review on May 22, 1973.
3. CONTENTION S1

A.

Petr raises the point that the statute is no

different from the one in James and does not afford exemptions
provided other debtors generally under Oregon law.
B. Petr also contends that the statute is patently
unconstitutional in that it applies only to indigent defendants
who have been convicted of crime, and does not apply to those

-4-

indigent defendants who, although they may have been represented
by court-appointed counsel, were fortunate enough to have
their cases dismissed or who were acquitted after trial by
jury. Petr cites Rinaldi Y...!.. Yeager, 384- U.S. 305 (1966). In
the Yeager case, this Court held unconstitutional a New
Jersey statute that authorized county treasurers to recover
costs incurred in preparing a trial transcript for indigent
defendants incarcerated in state institutions. Indigent defendants n c
incarcer~ted in these institutions were not required to pay. The
Court held that "[t]o fasten a financial burden only upon those
unsuccessful appellants who are confined in state institutions •••
is to make an invidious discri.mination.

11

C. Petr finally alleges a denial of his Sixth Amendment

( '\

rights. He relies on In re Allen, where the California Supreme~
Court reasoned,
[w]e believe that as knowledge of this practice
has grown and continues to grow many indigent
defendants will come to rAalize that the judge's
offer to supply counsel is not the gratuitous
offer of assistance that it might appear to be;
that, in the event the case results in a grant of
probation, one of the conditions might well be the
reimbursement of the county for the expense
involved. This knowledge is quite likely to deter
or discourage many defendants from accepting the
offer of counsel despite the gravity of the need
for such representation as emphasized by the
Court in Gideon.
Petr analogizes the effect generated by the Oregon statute
to cases where statutory provisions have been held to deter
defendants in their exercise of the Fifth Amendment right
'against self-incrimination. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Sanitation
Men Assoc. v. Commissionerp 392 U.S. 280 (1968)1 Griffin v.

-5Californi a , 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Petr asserts that in order to be consistent
with the Oregon court ruling, any time a criminal indigent
defendant is advised of his Miranda rights, he should also
be advised that should he be convicted, he may well have to
reimburse the county for the costs of his court appointed
attorney's fees.
4. DISCUSSION, I would note first that there is no

'

.?

response to this petition. Petr's claim that the Oregon
statute is no different from the one in James, all things
being equal, may not hold water since the statute, as construed
by the majority, does not contain the infirmity found in James.
The statutes are not similar, however, in that James involved
a civil statute and the one here is part of the criminal
process, perhaps rendering a more direct impact on those
defendants who are indigents.
The distinction drawn between convicted and nonconvicted
indig~nts may not be so unreasonable as it sounds at first
glanceo An indigent wrongfully brought to the bar of justice
should not be expected to bear the burden of paying for the
state's mistakes, The statute here, moreover, is not mandatory,

---------

and is grounded on an ability to pay,

-------The real

----

question is whether knowledge of possibly forced

payment of attorney's fees will, in fact or in all probability,
deter or discourage a defendant from accepting the offer of
counsel to which he is entitled if he is indigent and charged

(

with a crime.
Again, there is no response,
10/18/73

Knicely

Op Ore Ct App i.n
Petr' s APDX,

,
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FOOTNOTES
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2

3

1
ORS 16l.G65 provides:

4

"(1)
The court may require a convicted defendant to pay costs.

5

"(2)
Costs shall be limited to expenses
specially incurred by the state in prosecuting
the defendant.
They cannot include expenses
inherent in providing a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial or expenditures ' in
connection with the main~enance and operation
of government agencies that must be made by
the public irrespective of specific violations of law.

6

7
8
9

· 10
11

"(3)
The court shall not sentence a
defendant to pay costs unless the defendant
is or will be able to pay them.
In determining the amount and method of payment of
costs, the court shall take account of the
financial resources of the defendant and the
nature of the burden that payment of costs
will impose.

\..._ l2

13
14
15

n(4)
A defendant who has been sentenced
to pay costs and who is not in contumacious
def~ult in the payment thereof may at any
time petition the court which sentenced him
for remission of the payment of costs . or of
any unpaid portion thereof.
If it appears
to the satisfaction of the court that payment
of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family,
the court may remit all or part of the amount
due in costs, or modify the method of payment
under ORS 161.675.

16
17
18

19
20
21

11

22

23

2

ORS 161.675 provides:
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l
2
3

4
5

6
7

"(l} When a defendant is sentenced
to· pay a fine or costs, the court may grant
permission for payment to be made within a
specified period of time or in specified
instalments.
If no such permission is included in the sentence the fine sh~ll be
payable forthwith.
"(2}
When a defendant sentenced to pay
a fine or costs is also placed on probation
or imposition or execution of sentence is
suspended, the court may make payment of the
fine or costs a condition of probation or
suspension of sentence."

8
9

10
ll
)

'

13

ORS 161.685 provides:
"(1} When a defendant sentenced to pay
a fine defaults in the payment thereof or of
any instalment, the court on motion of the
district attorney or upon its own motion may
require him to show cause why his default
should not be treated as contempt of court,
and may issue a show cause citation or a
·warrant of arrest for hi~ appearance.

14

(2}
Unless the defendant shows that
his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the
court or to a failure on his part to make a
good faith effort to make·the payment, the
court may find that his default constitutes
contempt and may order'him committed until
the fine, or a specified part thereof, is
paid.
11

15

16
17

18

19

(3} When a fine is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it
is the duty of the person authorized to make
disburseme nt from the assets of the corporation or association to _pay the fine from
those assets, and his failure to do so may
be held to be contempt unless he makes the
showing required in subsection (2) of this
section.
·u

20
21
22

23
24-
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1
"(4)
The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpuyment of fines shall be set
£:9rth in the commitment order, and shall not
exceed one day for each $25 of the fine, . 30
days if the fine was imposed upon conviction
of a violation or misdemeanor, or one year
in any other case, whichever is thci shorter
period.
A person committed for nonpayment of
a fine shall be given credit toward payment
for each day of imprisonment at the rate
specified in the commitment order.

1

.

2
5

4·

1
5

i

6

"(5)
If it appears to the satisfaction
of the court that the default in the payment
of a fine is not contempt, the court may
enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the .amount
thereof or of each instalment or revoking
the fine or the unpaid portion thereof in
whole or in part.

7

8
9

10
11

/

"(6)
A default in the payment of a fine
or costs or any instalment thereof may be
collected by any means authorized by law for
the enforcement of a judgment. The levy of
execution for the collection of a fine shall
not discharge a defendant committed to imprisonment for contempt until the amount of
the fine has actually been collected."

12

"-

13
14
15
16
17

· 2

ORS 137.180 provides:
18

"A judgment that the defendant pay money,
19

either as a fine or as costs and disbursements
of the action, or both, shall be docketed as
a judgment in a civil action and with like
effect, as provided in ORS 18.320, 18.350 and
18.400."

20
21
22

23

•3

ORS 137.450 provides:
.24
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.

··· ,.

.......

. .

"A judgment against the defendant in
a criminal action or the private prosecutor, so far as it requires the payme nt
of a fine or costs and disbursements of
the action, or both, may be enforced as a
judgment in a civil action."

1
2

3

4.

5
6
7
8
9

10
11

t i s clear from the Proposed cr{minal Code, § 80,
pp 76 , that the Criminal Law Revision Commission intended -he "costs" defined in ORS 161.665(2) include the
costs of legal assistance furnished an indigent.
Forme r
ORS 137.2
provided for taxation against a 'defendant for _
the cost o 16gal assistance furnished to him, and the
Proposed Cri inal Code states, see Table, p XXV, that the
intent of the Commission was that the substance of form e r
ORS 137.205 be retained by placing it in what is now ORS
161. 665 (2).

12

13

I

5

ORS 137.540(10)

rovides:

14

"The court sh 1 determine, and may
at any time modify,
he conditions of
probation, which may ·nclude, as well as
any others, that the p obationer shall:

15
16

(10) Make reparati
or restitution to the aggrieved part for the damage
or loss caused by offense,
an amount to
be determined by the court."

17

u

18
19
20

21

6

22

The opinion of the California Suprem Court indicat e s
that at least as of the date of that opini
California
had no recoupme nt· statutes similar to Oregon's.

23

.24

"The condition of probation under
attack is the requirement ~hat the petition r
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What in the world is "invidious
discrimination?• Obviously its a
talisman to be employed in place
of legal analysis.
The result he,re may be right,
although the question is very close
after Rinaldi and your James opinion,
407 U.S. 128. But the pamcity of
analysis is very troubling. I think
you should review
2nd DRAFT
your James opinion and consilder

To: The
Mr ·.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Chief Justice
Justice Dou~las
Justice irennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice ilackmun
-~~M~~
..... Justice Powell
Xr. Justice Rehnquist
From: Stewa.rt, J ·

a short co~~~~!~e ?OURT_O
_F_TH
_ E UNITED
-'-'-'M'-'-'AY'---B_ _19_7_~_
The tension between
No. 73-5280
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ __
this and James ought
to be addressed and
resolved Prince Eric Fuller,)
by the
Petitioner,
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of
author of
v.
Appeals of Oregon.
James•
State of Oregon,
Jack

§IA!ffied:

[May -, 1974J
MR. JUSTICE Bn,; wAH'l' dehvered t,he oprn1ou of th e
Court,
In this case we are called upon to determine whether
Oregon may co11stitutionally require a person convicted
of a criminal offense to repay to the State the costs of
providing him with effective representation of counsel,
when he is indigent at the time of the criminal proceedings but subsequently acquires the means to bear the
costs of his legal defense.
The petitioner Fuller plt>aded ~uilty, on July 20, 1972,
to an information chargi11g him with sodomy in tlw third
degree.1 At the hearing on the plea and ill otlwr conrt
proceedings he was represented by a local member of the
bar appointed by th<' court upon thP petitioner's
representation that he was indigent a11d unable to hire
a lawyer. Fuller's counsel in turn hired a.n investigator
to aid in gathering facts for his defern:e, and the i11vei"t1 ..
gator's fees were also a>'snme<l by the "'tat,• Full(•r \, ....~
subsequently sentenced to fivP years of probation conditioned upon his satisfactorily complying with the require~
ments of a work-release program at the county jail that

'
',,;.,

1
Other charges contained in the information agai11:,t Fuller wcrt'
dismis:,ed when his guilty plea wa;; aece1Jted.

.

...
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FULLER v. OREGON

would permit him to attend college, and also upon his
reimbursement to the county of the fees and expenses of
the attorney and investigator whose services had been
provided him because of his indigeut status. On appeal
to the Oregon Court of Appeals, his principal contention
was that the State could 11ot constitutionally condition
his probation on the repayrnent of these expenses! With
one judge dissenting, the imposition of his sentence was
affirmed , ~ Ore. App. - , 504 P. 2d 1323, and the
Supreme Court of Oregon subseq1w11tl) r!Pnied F11ll1 r'i-:
petition for revww
- On•
-, - - P. ~d --. B<'cause of th e importanc<' of tllP q1wstion pn'1:,entcd nncl
the conflict of opinion on the constitutional issue
involved,3 we gran ted cert iorari, U. S.
.
1

I
We b<>gin with consideration of the pl a.11 all(! operat1011
of the challenged statute. By force> of i11terpretat10u or
2
ln addit ion, Fuller arg11ni that tllC' ,;c•c·tion of the Orpµ:011 J\c·o11pmcnt ~tat ute a11thonzing an ohligM1011 to rq>: y ·p:,,.p('I\~<'~ ~IH'<·i.ill)
incurred h,\' t he• ,;tat<• in pro~Pe11ting tlw ddPnd:111t," On• HPv Ht:d
§ 161.655 (2), srt' n. ,5, mfrn, wa~ 11 01 mt< ndPtl b) thl' :,,L1tr lrg;1~lat11r-0
to mcludc roun~el fpps, T hb b~ll(' of ,ta te law wa,, rr:,:olvr•d agaiu,,t
the pct it ionc•r m tllf' 8tatr ('Oil rt , :L11d pro1wrl~ i,.. not rai~Pd lwrl\,
Murdock v. Cit !! of Mcrr1phis, 87 ll. 8. (:.!0 Wall.) :190
a Court,- or :,:omc' othPr Stat(·~, in reviP\l'mg 1t,g1slat10n ,irnilar to
that in que:;t1011 hrn>, havt' exprl'~~Pd v1Pw" on the• r·or1~titutionalitr
of thr l'C'C'OU]llllt'llt of dt•fr11~(' ('0~1, lll('Oll~i,tNH \\'Ith hl' dr('Mllll of
th P OrPgon Court or Appral8 ill thi~ ('a,P. fil
,llle11, i] Cal. '.2cl
388, 78 Cal , Rptr. 207 , 455 P :.!(I l·ta; 07m11011 uj the Justin", JOH
N. H . 508, 256 A. '.!d /)()0; State c.r r<'f. Rrn11daqe v. Hide, Wa,11,
-, I'. :.!d -- (?-,;o -l'.!,9\l.5 \p1. ., UJH). 'r ./a1111s
Stranae, 32;{ F . Supp. 112:m (Ka11. ), aff'd 011 ot her ground,, m7 l'. S,
128 . SeP genrrally, A. B. A., Project on Pro viding Defrn~e S<'rvH·r,;,
58- 59 (Approv<'d D n 1ft 1968) ; Comment, RC"1mbur~ement of Defense Cost,; a~ a Condit 1011 of Proba tion for I mligent~, fi7 )Iirh L.
Rev . 140-l (1969 ) ; ~ c>tr>, C ha rgmg Co~t:,: of Pro~pru1ion to tlw l)(.1,
fendant, 59 Geo. L . .T. U91 (Hl71 ).

n,·
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,t he State's Constitution and comprehensive legislation ,
Oregon mandates that every defendant in a criminal case
tnust be assigned a lawyer at state expense if "li]t
a.ppears to the court that the defendant is without means:
and is unable to obtain counsel. " Ore. Rev. Stat. ~ 133,
,625."' As part of a recoupment statute passed in 1971~
rOregon requires that in some cases all or part of the
"expenses specially incurred by the state in prosecuting
the defendant" be repaid to the State, a·nd that when a
convicted person is plar<>cl 011 prohation rc-pay1n~11t of
such expenses may be rnadP a comhtio11 o probation.'

-

Ore'. RC'v. Stat.§ J:3:3Ji25 (a) (2 ) direct" thnt eotm~d lw ,IJJpo111t<·J
for an indigrut dC'fendant whru lw it-1 " I<" IhnrgC'd with a crim" fol
which a fr lony ,-p11t< J1Cl' could lw 1111poHPd," Ot·P. Hev. Htat § 1!il.5!l!i
define:,, a mi~demrauor a~ a ,·mm• for whl<'h a c·om,i<"tPd ddt•wlanl
may be ~t'ntenl·Pd to a, mu<"h :i, on,, \'l':tr 111 pri~on. ..;, t' ,ii 'O Un
Hev. Stat.§ Wl.015 Tlw <·xtP11t1011 ot tlH' rI!};ht to <·01111~<·1 to 1ho,,
chargPd with any enmr wns a<'<·ompli~hrd b~· tlw S11prcnw Co11r1 of
Orrgon in 8tevcnso11 v. llolzma11. 254 Ore', 04, 4GH l' 2d 414 (Hlfi\J)
th us tsati:sfymg in advaiH·P tlw t'<•q1 1in•me11t~ of Aroers111r;er \. I/om/in,
407 u. S 25
r, On•. Hev. Stat.§ ltil.H05 providl·s.
" ( 1) T lw C'Ollrt ma~· n'qnt!'<' a <·011viC"t('({ d<·frndant to pa_, <·o.,t,-;
"(2) Cost,; 1:,lrnll lw lunit<·d to <' '])<·11,-t,~ ~1><·<·1:dl~ llH'lll'l'<'d h~· th<
t<tate in pro;;C'cut Ill/,! t lw d<•i'Pndant. Th<')' <"a nnot lll<'l 11dP <'XI 'l'n,r·,
inhl•n•nt 111 prondmg a con~t 1t 11t ton a 11, g11:i ra ntPPd .1 tlf) t nal or I'
pPnditlll'l',< Ill C'Ollll\'('1!011 with tllP m,IIt1tt•JJall('(' :\lid O])PlallOII ot )',Olemme11 t HgPnew ... that n111~t l>l· tnadl• by th<' 1n1hlH· 1rrespl·<·t 1\ <' ot
SJJ<'<·1fic v1olatwrn, of la\1
" (3) ThP court :shall not srutPllC'<' a defendant to pa~· co,,ts uni<•,-,-.
the dC'foudant is or will bC' ablP to pa~· tlwm. Tn t!C'trrmining tlw
amoun t and mPt ho<l of paymmt of <'OHt:s, the court ~hall tnkr ae<·ount
of the financial rP~o11n°(\• of th<' cl<·fPndant and thP nature• ot th,
burdrn that paymPnt or rost~ will mqll>~<·
" ( 4) A ddr11dant who has lw<'n sr11 t(•11c·Pd to pay <'Ost:, and who i8
not in contumaciou:, dPfonlt m thr paymPnt tlH r<•of nrn.1· ,,t au,
time pPt1t1011 till' t·ot11t wlrn·h ,-i•11tp111·<;d him tor rrrni~~io11 ot tin
paymPnt of co,t~ or of an~ unpaid port1<>n tlH•rpof lf 1t apJl(':1r., to
t he' ~at 1~fact10n of th~· <011rt thut pa,nnl'nt of tbP ,1rno1111t dn" will
impo~c· manifeist hardship on the• 'c!Pflo1idiii1t or h1:-; 1mmPdrntt• fomJI),
4

0

0
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These expenses include the costs of the convicted person's legal defense. 6
As the Oregon a.ppellate court uoted in its opinion in
this case, however, ~:e r~cr1i!·en~ nt
i;,_e pae ent "~

-2!

the court may remit all or part of the amount duP in ('Osts, or modit'y
the method of payment under Ore. Rev. Stat. § Hil.675 ."

Ore. Rev. Stat.§ IGUi75 provides :
"( l) When a defendant i8 sentenced lo pay a fine or costs, tht~
court may grant permission for payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified instalments. U no ~uch pennis,
~ion ls included in the sentrnc<• the fine ~hall lw pa~·ablP forthwith.
"(2) When a defendant ~entem·Pd io pay a fine or eosts is also
placed 0~4robatlo11 or irnpo,itlon or (•XP<·ution of ~Pnle11ce is ~n~= : r t e COllrt
- • may
'
k payment ol'. t Ile f'me OJ Co~tb a COildJ "
JJeuueu,
ma'('
tiol_!- _of probntiou or:,_i:;qspenRion of ~entern·<i."
··
Ore. RPv. Stat.§ 161.GSS 1,rovld.Ps.
" ( l) When a. defrndant S('nt<'ll<'C'fi to pa~ a firw defa11lt~ in tlrn
payment thereof or of any inst al nwnt, 1h1 ('01n·1 on mot ion of I ht•
district attornry or upon it8 own motion
r<'quin• him to ~hO\~
cause why his ckl'ault should not be trc,atc•d a~ contPm:pt of eourt,
and may J:;:;rn~ a Hhow cau~P ch at ion or n wanant of arr('st; for hls
appearance.
"(2) Unless till' ddPndallt show~ that hi~ d<'iauh wa,, not attrihutable to an l 1t eutioua I ref u8al to ()il<'\ tlw ordc•r of the co11r1 or to
a failure 011 his pan to ma'!' a goo~ fuilh 1·li'nr1 to makr lh, r,a,ment , the court may find that bis dl'fa11lt ,·011~rl1~~tPmp1 and
mny ord<~r hnn committed until the ti11e,~u"'a :-:pe<"ifl,•d p:irt tl11·rPoi',

,..

~

'•

may

.,

'

.

is 1mid.
"(3) ,vhPn :1 fin<· iH imposed on a corporatlo11 or 1111i11corporaiPd
asr,ociation, it is the duty of the per~Oll a ut horizt•d to make dis.
bursement from the as~ets of the corporation or association to pay
the fine from those assets, nnd his failure to do so inn~· be held to
be contrmpt unlP~~ he nrnke~ the ,-bowing rc·quir<'d i11 ,;11bst>ctio11 (2)
of this ~cction .
" ( 4) The term of impri,;onm<'llt for eontemp1 for no11pn_vment of
thrns 8hall be ,;et forth m tlw (·ommitmc'n! order, and ,;hall uo1 t,xc<'ecl
one day for each $25 of t.lw fow, :JU days if 1 hr fin<' w11~ unpo~ed upon
conviction of a violation or mi,;denwanor. or OIH' year in an~ oillPI"
PflSO, whichever b the shortt'r [Wriod .
p11r~on commit 11,rf for uoi,-.

;l.

'

"

1
\

[lfootuote 6'

i8 on p, f)

.

~

''

.'
,.I,
.J;,,•.

~
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il~ver mandator " Ore. App., at - , 504 P. ~ci,
a · 13. 5. Rather, several conditions must be satisfied
before a perSbh may be required to repay the costs of his
legal defense. First, a requirement of repayment may
be imposed only upon a convicted defendant; those whd
are acquitted, whose trials end i11 mistrial or dismissal,
and those whose convictions are overturned upon appeal
face no possibility of being required to pay. Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 161.665 (1) . Recond, a court may not order
convicted person to pay tlwi-,11 ( 1xpc, 1~<'~ unl<'ss I< 1 llr
will be able to pay them." On'. R<'v Stat. ~ lOUH,r, i a;
The sentencing court must "ta,kc ac•cotm t of the financrn,l
resources of the defendant and the nature of the bur<lrn
that payment of costs will ' impo~e.'' ibid. As the
Oregon court put the matter in this case, no requirement
to repay may be imposed if it appears at .the time of
sentencing that "there is no likelihood that a defendant's
indigency will end .... '' 504 P. 2d, at l:3!i7 Third, a.
convicted person under an obligation to repay "may at (
any time pctit10n the court \\ hich ~<'11te11c~d him fo
remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid por ..
tion thereof.'' Ore. RP,· Stm ~ 161.6fi5 (4 ). Th(
court is empowPrcd to renut if payment ''will irnpol:'C

~

IO tl

~·

&7"""~

v - . ~
~

/.,1---

~~

-

.--"

a(k---:._..~

I

P•t 'ment of a fine ~hall b<· ~ivcn rred11 toward pa~ llll'll( for \':1d1 dny
of imprisonment at the rat<' "pecified 111 1he commitme11t order.
"(5) If it appear" to thr ,;a11~faetwn of the c•ourt that tlw dl'falll1
in the payment of a fine i,, not eont(•mpt, the court ma~· 1•nt<'r ail
order allowmg thr drfcndant ndd1tional tinw tor paYnwnt, ml11('111g
the amount thereof or of <'a<'h in"talme11t 01· rcYokmg the till(' or the
unpaid J>ortio11 thrrcof m whole or 111 part .
"(6) A default in the paymPnt of a fmP or l'O"t" or auy in,-talmr,nt
thereof may be collectrd by any mra11~ authorized b~· law for tlw enforcemrnt of a judgment. Thl• levy of l'Xl'<'Htlon for thr ('Olll'elion
·of a fine sb~ ot di,;drnrge a drfrndant 1·omrr11tt<'d
to imprNmml•nt
i'
,.
·for contempt 1111til the amotmt of the fiJw ha,- actt11tlly been collect1-d."
6 See n. ·2, illpra.

~- ·

'

~
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his immediate
manifest hardshi
family . ..." lbia.
ma y, no convicte person may '
beJicld in contempt for failure to repay if he shows that
"his ctefautt= w:S not attributable to an intentional
refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on
his part to make a good faith effort to make payment . . . ." Ore. Rev. Stat. ~ 161.685.
Thus, the recouprnent statute is quite clearly directed
only at those convicted defendants who are indigent at
the time of the criminal proceedings against them but who
subsequently gain the ability to pay the expenses of legal
representation. Defendants with no likelihood of having
the means to repay are not put under <'VPII a condit10 1 1al
obligation to do so, and thOf'l' upon "horn a conchtional
obligation is imposed are not subjected to collection pro•
cedures until their indigency has ended and no "manifost
hardship" will result. The contrast with appointment
of counsel procedures i;1 States without recoupment
requirements 7 is thus relatively small: a lawyer is provided at the expense of the State to all defendants who (
are unable, even momentarily, to hire one, and the obligation to repay the State accrues only to those who later
acquire the mea11s to do so without hardship.

l

l

11
The petitioner's first con ten t101, is that Oregon 's
recoupment system violates the ~ ~ ~ecti~!! Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because of varwusc!assifications explicitly or irnplicity ~
-iegis"liitiv~
pro v1s1ons. He calls atte ntion too'i'u ""'le'Msion in J"iiiiic;J
v. "'Str<fnge, 407 F. S. 128. which held imalid under tllf'
7

The recoupment provision;- of ot hPr State" arP ~t out in the
Court's opinion in James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 13:!-133 allC! n. 8,
The federal rcimbur8emcnt provi,1011 i~ found at 18 U S. C.
§ 3006A (f).

"-·

.,

73-5280-0PJNION
FULLER v. OREGON

'l

Equal Protection Clause a law enacted by Kansas that
was somewhat similar to the legislation now before us.
But the offending aspect of the Kansas statute was its
provision~
that m an action to compel repayment of
counsef fe~ "[n]one of the exemptions provided in the
code of civil procecli'.ire [forcoilectloii of other Jiidg;~;nt
debts j sTiaii' arr,ly
any~~~~ineilt: ... "'""'~ Kans.
Stat. Ann~ -45f'S1aTTSupp. 1971), a provision which
"strip [ped] from the indigent defendants the array of
protective exemptions Kansas has erecter! for other civil
The Court
judgment dehtors . " 407 U. S., at mo
found that the elimination of the exemptions normally
available to judgment debtors "embodie[dl elements of
punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights
of citizens to equal treatment under the law." Td., at
142
The Oregon statute under cons1derat10n hen• ~uffen,
from no such infirmity. .\s the Oregon CourtofAppe~
ubset vect,-"No clemal of the exelllptions from execution \ ·'I
afforded to otfier judgment deotors 1s 111 cludecl in tlw
Oregon statutes':' Ore. ~ - - " = , 504 f5. 2c( at
1397:' 1nueed, a separa.te provision directs that "[a]
judgment that the defendant pay money, either as a fine
or as costs and disbursements of the action, or both, shall
be docketed as a judgment i11 a civil action and with like
effect . . .'' OrP. Rc•v. :-;tat ~ 1:n l~O. ThP eo11n<'t.pd 1
person frorn whom recoupnwnt is sought thus retains all
the exemptions accorded other judgment debtors, m mlclition to the opportunity to show at any time that recovery
of the costs of his legal defense will impose "manifest
hardship," ante, pp. 5-6. The legislation before us, there ..

-

- ----

to

Y

8

The Kansas statute allowed only one exception from the blanket
denial of exemptions nsually nvailnblr to judgment debtorH, f)<'l'mitting debtor:;: upon whom jndgm<•nt~ for eo,;t~ of l<•gal dpfp1,~t!
were executcxj to maintain thqr home~tends intact, Id., at la5.

,,

.

;.,, '

~/

'·

'•""

,"'

.•

.'
'
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~
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fore, is wholly free of the kind of discrimination that was
held in James v. Strange to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
The ~ itioner contends fur ther, however, that tho
Oregon stat ute denies equal protection of the_ laws in
a1wther way -0ychscnm111at rng between defend~
o
a~
ted, on the one hand, and those who are not
convicted or whose convictions are reversed, on the other.
Our review of this distinction, of course, is a limited one.
As the Court stated James v. Strange, supra, "We do not
'Wquire whether this statute is ,, is< or desirable . . . ,
Misguided laws may nonetlwk1-s h<' con13titutioual" 407
· U. S., at 133. Our task is merely to determine whetlwr
there is "some rationality in the nature· of the dass
singled out." Rinaldi , rra11Pr.. 3~4 e. s. ;{05, :ms.
309. See also McGinnis ,. Hoy.sfPr, 410 TT. S. 2G3,
McGowan v. 1v.laryland, 366 l'. S 420. In Hinnldi the
Court found impermissible New .Jersey's decisio n to
single out prisoners confined to state institutions for
imposition of an obligation to repay to the State costs
incurred in providing free transcripts of trial court proceedings required by this Court's decision in Grijfi'II v.
Illinois, 351 U. S. 12. The legislatiw deci:,ion to ta .·
those confin ed to prison hut not those also co11vict<·d
but given a suspended sentence, probation, or a fine
without imprisonmeut was found to lw !2;._Vidiou :tLv discriminatory and thus violative of the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause. In the case before us,
however, the sole distinction is between those who are
ultimately convicted and those who are not."

I

-----

0 The petitioner also clanm m hi,, brirf that a n•quirrmcnt to rrpa_\
legal defensr expem;rs has been imposrd onlr on eonv1eted drfendantiplaced on probation , and "hai:; not be<'n applied to tho,.;e convicted
indigents who were sent encrd to tNm~ of imprisomnrnt." Whilr (hi~
distinction might well be just1fi<'d ou till' gro1111d 1bat those rdeaHed
on probation arc more likely thmi tho~r incarcerated to lrnve t!HJ

.',

.

'

.

.' '
,,'

•

,,'·

,,i.

!,;
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We conclude that this classification is wholly noninvidious. A defendant whose trial ends without conviction or whose conviction is overturned on appeal has
been seriously imposed upon by society without any
conclusive demonstration that he is criminally culpable.
His life has been interrupted and subjected to great stress,
and he may have incurred financial hardship through
loss of job or pote11tial working hours. His reputation
may have been greatly damaged. The imposition of
such dislocations and hardships without an ultimatl' c< 11
viction is, of course. unavoiclabln in a lpgal system thut
requires proof of guilt bPyond n reasonable doubt and
guarantees important procedural protections to every
defendant in a criminal trial. But Oregon could surely
decide with objective rationality that when a defendant
has been forced to submit to a criminal prosecution that
does not end in conviction, he will be freed of any potential liability to reimburse the State for the costs of his
defense. This legislative c.k•cisiou reflects 110 more than
an effort to achieve elemf•ntal fairne8s and 1s a for rry
from the kind of invidious discrimrnation that thl, Equal
Protection Clause condemns. 111
ability to rarn money to rqwy, WP need not reach thi:- iH~II(' 8inl'e
the statute itself makes no such distinction, and t IH' pet 1tio1wr has
not demollstrated 011 this record that th<' Statr ha,; engagrd in any
pattern or practice embracmg it.
10 The petitioner'~ brirf a],;o raisr,;, without extended d1scu~:,;ion,
various due proces~ claim::, t h;t 1111po~1tion of the c·ond1trnrn1l obligation to repay wa8 made without ~umciPut. notH·<· or lwarii1g. Siw·e
these contentrnn;; appear not to have bren ra1~<'d 111 tlw :-tall' comtH,
and were not di8c11s;;rd by tlw On,gon Comt of Appeab, W<' llP<'d not
rc>ach them her€'. "[TJhis Court hnH statt'd that when . . tlw
highe:st state court ha,; failed to pas:; upon a fedNal question, it
will be a8~umed that the omi,;s10n was due to want of proper prrsentation in the 8tate courts, unlc88 the ng!(rieved party in tl11s Court
ran affirmatively ,;how the contrary." Strl'<'t ,. Nett' York, 394 l. S
576. 582 W<' notP in pa~~ing, IH>WPvrr, that th(' rN·oHpment ~tat,

73-5280-OPINION
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III

.
•,

The petitioner's second basic contention is that
·Oregon's recoupment statute infringes upon his constitutional right to have counsel provided by the State when
he is unable because of indigency himself to hire a
lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Argersinger v. H arnlin, 407 U. S. 25. The argument is not that
the legal representation actually provided in this case
was illeffective or insufficieu t, Nor does the petitioner
claim that the fees and expenses he may have to repay
constitute unreasonable cornpensat10n for the defeusc
provided him. Rather, he asserts that a defendant's
knowledge that he may remain uuder an obligatio11 to
repay the expeuses incurred i11 providillg him legal rPpr<·sentation might impel hirn to declille the st•rvices of au
a,pvointed attorney and thus "chill" lrn, co11st1tutiollctl
right to counsel.
This view was articulated by the 1Supreme Court of
California, in a case invalidating California's recoupment legislation, in the following terms:
"[W] e believe that as knowledge of I the recoup ..
ment] practice has grown and continues to grow
many i11dige11t defenda11ts will com<· to reaJi,w that
the judge's offer to supply eounsf'I _is not tlw gratui ..
tous offer of assistarH'P that it might app<>ar to be:
that, in the event, the case results in a grant of pro ..
bation, oue of the conditions nught we]] be the reimbursement of the county for the expeBse iuvo]ved.
This knowledge is quite likely to deter or discourage
many defendants from accepting the offer of counsel
tttes, including a ;;ehrclule of fee~. were publishrd in the Oregon
Revised Statute;; at tlw time of 11w pd it 1orwr'~ plea, and further
that both Oregon'~ judgnwnt PX<'eut10n ~tat11tp and her parole revo,
cation pro('ed ure~ providr for a !waring beforl' <>xt•rution can be,
levied or probation revoked,

,.

,,

.'
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despite the gravity of the need for such representation as emphasized by the lSuprerne] Court in
Gideon ...."

In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388. - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 207, - ,
455 P. 2d 143. We have concluded that this reasoning
is wide of the constitutional mark.
The focal point of this Court's decisions securing the
right to state-appointed counsel for indigents was the
"noble ideal" that every criminal defendant be assured
not only "procedural and substantive safeguards desig1wd
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which
every defendant stauds equal befon the la\\,'' but nlso
the expert advice necessary to recognize and take advantage of those safeguards. Gideon v. Wainwright
supra, 372 U. S., at 344. In the now familiar words of
the Court's seminal opinion in Powell v. 11labama, 287
u. s. 45 :
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehe11d the right to be
heard by counsel. Eve11 the intelligent aud educated
layman has small and sonwtimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself wlwther the
indictment is good or bad. He is UJ1familiar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the a1d of couusel he may be put on trial without a proper charge.
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or othrrwise inadrniss1ble. He lacks both tlw "kill a11d kncm ll·dg, ·ult•
quately to prPJHll'P his ddP11S<' evr n though ill' may
have a perfect oue. He requires t he guidi11g hand of
counsel at every step in th e proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence,"
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Id., at 68-69, quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372
U. S., at 344-345.
Oregon's system for providing counsel quite clearly
does not deprive any defendant of the legal assistance
necessary to meet these needs. As the State Court of
Appeals observed in this case, an indigent is entitled to
free counsel "when he needs it"-that is, during every
stage of the criminal proceedings against him. - - Ore.
App., at - , 504 P. 2d, 11t 1396. The fact that an
indigent who accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be required to repay
the costs of these services in no way affects his eligibility
to obtain counsel. The Oregon statute is carefully
designed to insure that only those who actually become
capable of repaying the State will ever be obliged to do
so. u Those who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work "manifest hardship" are forever exempt
from any obligation to repay.
We live in a society where the distribution of legal
assistance, like the distribution of all goods and services,
is generally regulated by the dynamics of private enterprise. A defendant in a criminal case who is just above

l

',:

l

11

The limitation of the obligation to repay to thoRc who are found
able to do so also di,;poses of thr argument, pretiented by an arnic'U8
curiae, that revocation of probation for failure to pa~· cornstitut<>s an
impenni~sible discrimination based on Wl'alth. See Tate Y. 8hnrt 1
401 U. S. ::l95; Williqms v. lllinoi&, :399 U. S. 235. A~ th(• Court
stated. in Tate v. Short . suwa, "We emphasize that our holding
does not suggest any con~titutional infirmity in imprisonment of a
defendant with the means to pay a fine who rcfuties or neglects to <lo
80." 401 U. S., at 400.
Similarly, the wording of Oregon 's statute make::; dear (hat a determination that an indigent "will br ablc 1' to make subsequent n •payment i:, a condition nece8sary for tlw initial imposition of th"
obligation to make repaymc•nl , but is no1 itself fl condition for
granting probation, or even fl factor to be (·om;idrrcd in drtrrminmg
whether probation ~hould he grantc'd .

...
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the line separating the indigent from the nonindigent
must borrow money, sell off his meager assets, or call
upon his family or friends in order to hire a lawyer. We
cannot say that the Constitution requires that those only
slightly poorer must remain forever immune from any
obligation to shoulder the expenses of their legal defense 1
even when they are able to pay without hardship.
This case is fundamentally different from our decisions
relied on by the petitioner which have invalidated state
and federal laws that placed a penalty on the exercise
of a constitutional right. See Uniformed Sanitation
Men Assn., Inc. v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 280; Gardner
v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273; United States v. Jackson,
390 U. S. 570. Unlike the statutes found invalid in those
cases, where the provisions "had no other purposC' or
effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights
by penalizing those who choose to exercise them," Un'ited
States v. Jackson, supra, 390 U. S., at 581, Oregon's
recoupment statute merely provides that a couvicted
person who later becomes able to pay for his counsel
may be required to do so. Oregon's legislation is tailored
to impose an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability to meet it. and to enforce that obligatiou
only against those who actually become able to meet it
without hardship.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Oregon is
affirmed.

'•'•,
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In my view, the Orrgon recouprnc•nt f'\tatutr at issue in
this case discriminates against indigent defoudants in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the principles established by this Court in Jame.~ \ . Stranye , 407
U. S 128 (H)72) . In that ca.-'<.' WI' held 11nco11stitutio11a.l
under the Equal Protection Clause a K,lll!--HS recoupnwut
statutr becausr it failed to prov1<.lc equal treatment
between indigent ddendauts and other civil judgment
debtors. We relied 011 the fact that indigent defendants
were not elltitlrd to the protectivr exemptions Kansas
had erectrd for other civil judgment debtors,
The Oregon n•coupmrnt statute at issue here similarly [
provides un(•qual trPatmcnt betwcm1 indigent defendants
ahu otiwr civ1r .111dgniellt debtors. l'he ma,,ority o6fliscaies the 1ssm• in tl1is ease by focusing solely 011 tJ1e
question wlwthcr the Oregon statute affords an indigent
defendant the same protective exemptions provided other
civil debtors. True, as collstrucd hy the Oregon Court
of Appeals, thr statute• docs not discriminate in this
regard. But the treatment it affords indigent defendants
remains unequal in a11othcr, even more fundamental
rc"°spcct. The important fact wh1eh the ma1ority ignores
fs tlu{t ~ df'r Oregon law .. ti~- repayment of the• indi§._ent
dt>fendaut's dr bt to tlw HtatP ('fl.II hf rna1fi: a conditioH
of n 1s probation, as 1t was 111 this ca::ic. 7.'cfatwn~r"'s

I

_;_;19=.!7i...!.'1

------

FFLLER v. OREGON
f@ ure to pay his debt can result in his being sent to
prison. In this respect the indigent defendant in Oregon,
likethe indigent defendant in James Y. Strange, is treated
quite differently from ~lrnr civil ,judgment debtor&'\
Petitioner's "predican~mclcr-Uus statute comeg
into sharper focus when compared with that of oue who
has hired counsel in his defense.'' 407 U. S., at 1:lS,
Article 1, ~ 19 of the Ore~on Constitution provides that
"Th£re shall be no im prisonment fo!:., c~ bt, excep t in cafil)
of fraud or absconding del2tors. " Hrncc, the nonindigt>nt
defendant in a criininal case ill OrPgon who Jors not pay
his privately rPtamed rou ns<'l. Pvon after 11C' obtarns the
means to do ~o. cannot h{· imprisoned for such failuru,
The lawyer in that instance Jnll!'lt enforc<' his judg111<•11t
through the 11ormal ro11t('S available to a creditor-by
attachrnen t, lien , garnish llll'll t, or tho likr.. Pctition<·ri
on th(• other hand, faces five years behiml bars 1f h<> fails
to pay his "debt" arising out of the appointment of
counsel.
Article 1, ~ H) of tlw Oregon Com;titution is representative of a fundanH'ntal stat<• policy consistent with the
rnockrn r<>jection of the practice of imprif-'onmcnt for rleht
as u1111eces!'larily cruel and c'-sentially counterproduct1vc•,
Sine<' OrP~on choos<'s not to provid1• imprism11ne11t for
rlebt for wPll-hecled defendant~ who do not pay their
retained counsel, I do not believe it ca.11. consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause , imprison an indigent
defendant for his failure to pa.y thccosts of lus appornte<.l
cowirl'
as~\\~
Jame.~ v~ Strange, a State

l

.For

3 The majority argtH'" that we ha,·r r<·<·o~11iz1•d no eon~tii11tional
infirmity in imprisoning a dd(•11dant with 1he llll'flll s to pay a fiuc
who refu~c.~ or 1wgl<'<'I~ to do :::.o Ante, nt n. 11. Thi;: Wt'
dors 1101 iuvolvc a fim·, hm,·<,,·c·r. b11t rnt hrr Pnforl'<'nwnt of a
debt for !Pgal ::,ervH·c·~. Tlw fact l'l'lllai11~ 1hat Orrgon impri~on»
a def Pnda11t with appoint(•<! rollll::'<'i who rrfo"p" or m•i:d<'rt~ to
1iay hi~ debt for lrgal S('J'Vi<'C~ CV('Jl tho11gh ·thh• to pa?·, Im( r!<w,

I
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may not "impose unduly harsh or discrirnillatory terms
solely because the obligation is to the public treasury
n.1..ther than to a private creditor." 407 U. S., at 138.
I would therefore hold the Oregon recouprnent statute
unconstitutional uuder the Equal Protection Clause insofar as it permits payrn:ent of the indigent defendant's
debt to be made a condition of his probation.2 I respec~
fully dissent.

.

'

.. ,
'

'

.

...;~...

11ot imprison a defendant. with retained counsel in t!ie sanw
circnmstanct's.
2 In light
of my di8po~it ion of thc equal proteet ion clitirn, I
J1:we no ocra8ion to eonsif!er petitioner '8 contention that Home
other defendant':; knowlc•dgf' that. he ma;\· have to reimburse the
Stntr for providing him legal rrpre;;en1ation might impPl him to
decline thr srrvicc~ of au appointed attorney nncl t,hus ehill hi~
Sixth Amendment. right to roun~d. In any evmt, in m:v \'iew
8Uch a claim could more' appropriately be considered by this Court
in the context of an actual case involving a defendant who, unlike
petitioner, had rrfusecl nppointed cotmsel and rontendcd thn1 his
refusal was not n. knowing and vol11ntary waivrr of hi~ Sixth Amendment rights bel'at1~e it was bm,rd upon his fear of bearing the
bmclrn of a debt for appointed counsel or upon his failure to undt'I'~
-,tai'id the limitations the State impoHr.s on such a debt.
0
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Comments on dissenting opinion
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall'argues
that the Oregon statutory scheme is discriminatory as
between indigent defendants who may be placed "behind bars''
upon a fK.tllXa: failure to reimburse the state and "other
civil judgment debtors".

Infra at 1.

The dissent singles

out for comparison the "well heeled defendants who do not
pay their [privately] retained counsel".

Id. at 2.

James

v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) is relied upon in concluding
that this "uneoual treatment" violates the Equal Protection
Clause.

-

Reliance upon James v. Strange is misplaced.

Both

the Kansas statute there involved and the statute now before
the ~ourt were designed to recoup expenses, including the
providing of free counsel, incurred by the state on behalf
of indigent defendants.

Apart from this common purpose,

the two statutory schemes for recoupment have little in
common.

As outlined in the Court's opinion, the Oregon
,·

..

2.
statute provides broadly protective conditions which must
be satisfied before repayment liability arises.

Thus, rather

than discriminate against indigent defendants as compared
with other judgment debtors, Oregon imposes the repayment
obligation only when it appears that the convicted defendant
"is or will be able to pay them", and that payment "will
impose [no] manifest hardship on the defendant or his
innnediate family • • .'' Supra, at 5,6. Indeed, in view
of the extent of the ppotection accorded by the Oregon
statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oregon,
one wonders as to its practical efficacy.
dissent, citing the Oregon constitutional

The

provision against imprisonment for debt, emphasizes the
distinction between the ''cruel and essential counterproductive" (infra, at 2) sanction of imprisonment and
the normal remedies s.v ailable for the nonpayment of civil
' indebtedness.

The dissent misappreciates the situation.

This is a case in which imprisonment for contempt may
result.

It is not a ca.se of imprisonment for failure

to pay for an indebtedness.

There is no automatic

3.

remission to prison in the event of the failure by some
specified time to reimburse the state for costs incurred
on behalf of the indigent.

The condidions above mentioned

first must be satisfied as to ability to pay and absence of
hardship; in addition the failure to pay must be "an
intentional refusal to bbey the order of the court ••
Ore. Rev. Stat.

§

161685.

It

Imprisonment for deliberate

contempt of a court's order is hardly to be compared with
imprisonment for indebtedness arising out of private
contractual relationship.
Moreover, in this case

we have a probation order

following conviction on a criminal charge, a.n d the
reimbursement of the state - subject to the statutory
protective provisions - is a condition of the probation.
A sentencing court has broad discretion in imposing
conditions on probation and such conditions customarily
'impose restrictions and obligations on the convicted
defendant which would be facially invalid if applied to
free citizens.*

In this case, the requirement that

*ft.mong the most conunonplace of these, for example, is a
restriction against the right to travel.

,,'

4.
indebtedness owed the state be repayed by respondent
during the probationa.ry period, if and when the petitioner
"'1

~

able to do so,

,f

~t

an unreasonable

condition to the special status of probationee.
The state has a legitimate interest, indeed perhaps
a duty, to seek recoupment of taxpayer funds made available
to indigent defendants if and when such defendants are
able to reimburse the state.
at 141.

See James v. Strange, supra,

The classification embracing such defendants

is reasonable and in furtherance of the state interest.
Such defendants constitute a class different in obvious
respects from citizens not convicted of crime and who
have no obligation to repay public funds.

The dissent/

at"temptsto analogize between respondent and a defendant
I\

who may be indebted to his privately retained counsel.
The asserted analogy is in pt.
I

Apart from the special

'•

.

, protections afforded convicted indigents relating to
I

abilitro pay, which are not afforded the ordinary debtor,
there is the special interest of the state in recovery
of sums owed to it.

See James v. Strange, id. at 137,138.
·'

The means adopted by Oregon for facilitating recovery
cann,ot be said to be unreasonable.

May 10, 1974
.. •
,,
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Dear Potter:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

-~.
1.,/'·

Mr. Justice Stewart
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1··,'·

,,
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-
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·,·

Dear Potter:
I am glad to join your opinion for this case.
Sincerely,

Mr, Justice Stewart

cc:

The Conference
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Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Stewart
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